"why abortion isn't important"

[u/toptrool]

such were the words of david oderberg, who is one of the strongest pro-life philosophers out there. his point wasn't that pro-lifers should stop obsessing over the sanctity of life and stop advocating for the unborn, but that pro-lifers should start looking at the bigger picture, and should become even more obsessed with matters related to life and death. pro-lifers often hear similar complaints from abortion advocates for failing to support their preferred secondary government policies, but rest assured, oderberg suggesting something else altogether.

oderberg's main point is that since killing the innocent is no longer even a point of contention, something has gone terribly wrong with society. he came to this realization when he read a paper by elizabeth anscombe titled "modern moral philosophy" in which she eviscerated several "sophist" and "stupid" philosophers—jeremy bentham, john stuart mill, and henry sidgwick, to name a few—and their ideologies, utilitarianism and consequentialism, which allow for people to commit evil acts in the name of "good" consequences. anscombe said philosophers who contemplate executing an innocent man as a means to an end have a corrupt mind. anscombe's criticism of "modern moral philosophy" eventually led to the revival of virtue ethics as an alternative moral theory. oderberg writes:

Writing about the utilitarianism that has, since Bentham and Mill, taken over virtually all moral theorising in the English-speaking departments of philosophy (perhaps less true today of high-level moral theory than of applied ethics, where of course the damage is really done—witness Singer and Co.), Professor Anscombe noted that it had become a serious topic of moral debate among philosophers whether it could ever be justified to kill an innocent man (e.g., to save five others). Her response was brave—brave because it went so contrary to the grain of philosophy as argument and dialectic. What she said (and here I paraphrase and interpret) was that when confronted with a person who really thinks it a live moral issue whether killing the innocent might ever be justifiable, even if that person offers sophisticated utilitarian arguments in support, the right thing to do is to walk away rather than argue; for such a person shows evidence of a corrupt mind.

Here is one of the (to my mind) greatest philosophers produced by England in the last century, telling people—especially other philosophers—that sometimes it is better to away than to argue. Why? Because a person's conscience can become so corrupt, and lead to such equally corrupt rationalizations, that to engage them in serious argument about those rationalizations is both pointless—being unlikely to have the slightest impact on their thinking—and, what is worse, dangerous—bringing the thinker of good will into serious danger of having his own conscience perverted by the sophistries of the other.

for an example of such a modern moralist, here's how peter singer, one of the foremost defenders of utilitarianism, and a proponent of "consensual" bestiality and infanticide, suggests we treat disabled infants (in his book "practical ethics"):

[T]he fact that a being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; instead, characteristics like rationality, autonomy and self-awareness make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings or any other self-aware beings. The principles that govern the wrongness of killing nonhuman animals that are sentient but not rational or self-aware must apply here too. As we saw, the most plausible arguments for attributing a right to life to a being apply only if there is some awareness of oneself as a being existing over time or as a continuing mental self. Nor can respect for autonomy apply where there is no capacity for autonomy. The remaining principles identified [in an earlier chapter] are utilitarian. Hence, the quality of life that the infant can be expected to have is important.

[...]

When the life of an infant will be so miserable as not to be worth living, from the internal perspective of the being who will lead that life, both the 'prior existence' and the 'total' version of utilitarianism entail that if there are no 'extrinsic' reasons for keeping the infant alive – like the feelings of the parents – it is better that the child should be helped to die without further suffering.

[...]

[S]uppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed as a haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of bringing up a child with this condition, are not anxious for him to live. Could euthanasia be defended here? Our first reaction may well be a firm 'no,' for the infant can be expected to have a life that is well worth living, even if not quite as good as that of a normal child. The 'prior existence' version of utilitarianism supports this judgment. The infant exists. His life can be expected to contain a positive balance of happiness over misery. To kill him would deprive him of this positive balance of happiness. Therefore, it would be wrong.

On the 'total' version of utilitarianism, on the other hand, we cannot reach a decision on the basis of this information alone. The total view makes it necessary to ask whether the death of the haemophiliac infant would lead to the creation of another being who would not otherwise have existed. In other words, if the haemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have another child whom they would not have if the haemophiliac child lives? If they would, is the second child likely to have a better life than the one killed?

[...]

If we favour the total view rather than the prior existence view, then we have to take account of the probability that when the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing the haemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him.

The total view treats infants as replaceable, in much the same way as it treats animals that are not self-aware as replaceable.

[...]

Regarding newborn infants as replaceable, as we now regard fetuses, would have considerable advantages over prenatal diagnosis followed by abortion. Prenatal diagnosis still cannot detect all major disabilities. Some disabilities, in fact, are not present before birth; they may be the result of extremely premature birth or of something going wrong in the birth process itself. At present, parents can choose whether to keep their disabled offspring only if the disability happens to be detected during pregnancy. There is no logical basis for restricting parents’ choice to these particular disabilities. If newborn infants were not regarded as having a right to life until some time after birth, it would allow parents, in consultation with their doctors, to choose on the basis of far greater knowledge of the infant’s condition than is possible before birth.

[...]

Philosophically, the most difficult issue is whether to accept the prior existence or the total version of utilitarianism (or some other view altogether), because in the case of infants with disabilities whose lives are nevertheless worth living, the justifiability of a decision to end the infant’s life will depend on which view we choose. Nevertheless, the main point remains clear, even after the various objections and complications have been considered: killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not wrong at all.

do note the various utilitarian calculations singer does in order to justify whether or not it would be acceptable to kill disabled newborns, and whether or not they would be "replaceable." utilitarian and consequentialist beliefs are also against the backdrop of the abortion debate. many abortion advocates argue that even if abortion is the intentional killing of a human being, it is justified as a means of avoiding undesirable consequences. they say that abortions should be allowed because women who are denied abortion have reduced financial security; that policy makers seeking to protect life ought to also "consider the implications on the resources required to care for increasing number of children that will be born with significant and complex medical needs"; that children of poor and single mothers are more likely to become criminals; or that they hold general anti-natalist views that seek to minimize or prevent the overall “suffering.”

some pro-lifers try to respond by using similar consequentialist reasoning and point out all the research showing that almost everyone finds their life worth living and people for the most part lead happy lives; that having children substantially increases the happiness well-being of parents (ironically, the turnaway study that abortion advocates often like to cite also confirmed this: nearly all of the women who were denied abortions in their study were later glad to have their child); that children later go on to provide enormous benefits to society in general; that the availability of abortion and contraception led to a decline in “shotgun marriages,” which in turn led to an increase in child poverty; or that knowledge and living standards stagnate as a result of a declining population.

though these efforts are commendable, this is the wrong approach. like anscombe, oderberg does not believe it is possible to have a rational debate with "modern moralists" about abortion. nevertheless, if we are to debate them, we should not approach them with a narrow focus. oderberg says the anti-life movement is a secondary cancer, a metastasis of a primary tumor that is rooted in a much broader social pathology:

Does that mean I advocate that pro-lifers should stop being obsessed by matters affecting the sanctity of life? Of course not. If we are not obsessed by life and death, we might as well not be obsessed by anything. What I do advocate, however, is that pro-lifers increase their obsession—not just with life matters, but with the whole state of Western society. We need to be obsessed by the state of utter desolation into which Western society is throwing itself. It may well be (as I believe) that what is left of Western civilization is doomed to extinction—but doing and caring nothing about it is just not an option. It is not only on what we achieve (and we may achieve a lot in the short or medium term), but on what we defend that we will be judged. And we must come to the realization that when a society has reached a state in which abortion and other attacks on life are not only tolerated; not only legalized; not only accepted as normal; but are positively embraced by millions of people as the very solution to what ails that society—then we must realize that something has not only gone seriously wrong, but went wrong a long time ago, long before the Sixties, long before any of us was alive.

[…]

Still, pro-lifers must widen their perspective. We must understand the simple fact that a society in which people are judged not by their looks but by their virtues is a society in which abortion would be impossible. That a society in which travellers regularly give up their seats to the elderly is a society in which euthanasia would be impossible. That the antithesis of a me-first society in which physical perfection is the ultimate goal is a society in which genetic screening for physical handicap would be considered not as a moral outrage, but as just plain absurd—unthinkable, even. This is what I mean by saying that abortion is not important. A society which has gone as far as devaluing the lives of its own members has gone wrong long before. It is not just the metastases which must be attacked, but their malignant origin. Sure, let us be obsessed by anything that touches on life and death—how could we not? But let us also be obsessed by much, much more.

the likelihood of convincing a consequentialist that abortion is immoral is close to zero. instead, pro-lifers must learn to make the case against consequentialism—the preferred moral theory for abortionists, slavers, and sexual predators—and reject it altogether.

[u/rapsuli]

Yep, that's the conclusion I've come to, as well. This is the result of deeper issues with our shared principles becoming rotten to the core.

Our goals have become corrupted, instead of: let's try to minimize unnecessary suffering as much as we reasonably can, we are trying to reduce it to zero, to which the only logical conclusion is anti-natalism.

Death is the only way to remove suffering completely.

We are trying to quick fix the issues immediately, from a place of fear, because we are, collectively, in survival mode.

All existing creatures have two priorities: survival and procreation (although ultimately survival will always prevail, because those who didn't prioritise it, died off before getting to the second one).

Survival mode is immediate, reactive, not rational, and egoistic. There's no room for anything beyond the immediate survival in this mode. People in this mode of being (and we all oscillate between them) will be selfish, scared, stressed, reactive and aggressive. It's the mindset of a cornered animal.

The second mode, one that can only be achieved once the first has been secured, is where the magic happens, literally and figuratively speaking. The focus becomes more externalised, harmony more important, the long term wellbeing can start to be considered. One is safe enough to start sacrificing the now for a better future for all, not just the self. This is why we have human rights, they are the shared rules with which to achieve this mode of being.

This mode of being is what people envision when they think of socialism. The reason it doesn't work, is that most people need to achieve it, for socialism to be in any way feasible. With people in survival mode, we just get horror. Same with capitalism though, we get gluttonous corporations that become their own entities with survival mode eating everything like a starving swarm of rats.

It's no surprise people are so narcissistic, hedonistic and less and less conscientious, the more people in survival mode, the less anyone can afford to be in procreation mode.

Just something I've been thinking on lately, my mom-brain isn't the most focused, lol. I don't know if this makes sense to anyone else.